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Law as Film: Representing Justice in the Age of Moving
Images
Shulamit Almog† and Ely Aharonson‡
‘‘It is not easy to believe in unknowable justice’’

ones, the law makes continuous and complicated efforts
to provide itself with legitimacy. 1 One method it uses to
create this sense of legitimacy is to present its actions as
phenomenological embodiments of the abstract idea of
justice, thereby creating an epistemological hierarchy
between actions that take place within the legal system
and those that occur outside of it. 2

— W.H. Auden, Compline
‘‘We have raised a dust and complain that we cannot see’’
— George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

It is in this context that the maxim that ‘‘justice
must be seen in order to be done’’ 3 becomes relevant.
The visibility of justice in a court of law enhances the
legitimacy of the act of judgment that has been performed. Yet this needs to be unpacked: Justice is not a
concrete object that can be ‘‘seen’’, so when we speak of
‘‘seeing justice’’, we are actually speaking about seeing an
image that we associate with justice. In order for the legal
system to show us that it is doing justice, it must constantly present us with such images. Thus, for a particular
society’s legal system to gain broad social legitimacy as a
justice-producing system, it must effectively represent,
through its performances of adjudication, images of the
abstract concept of justice commonly adhered to in that
society.

Introduction

T

wo main theses are presented here. The first is that
there is a conceptual resemblance between the ways
in which messages are transmitted in the courtroom and
the ways in which they are transmitted in the cinema.
The second is that the evolution of legal procedure is
being influenced by developments taking place in visual
culture generally and film specifically. Taken together,
these theses lead to the conclusion that the development
of a theory of ‘‘law-as-film’’ can provide insights into the
contemporary practice of law that might otherwise be
overlooked.

One of the ways to think about law is as a system of
representation that seeks to convince society that it
maintains exclusive control over the meaning of the concept of justice. In furtherance of this goal, it continually
seeks to demonstrate its skill in the identification and
application of the concept in ways that are visible to, and
accepted by, society at large.

Part I: Law as Film
How can justice be seen? Law as a system
of visual representations

A

commonly accepted concept of justice serves as the
foundation of every legal system. Societies entrust
judges with the authority to delineate the commonly
ascribed-to concept of justice through the application of
general law to particular situations, the development of
precedent, and the interpretation of existing rules. The
rulings of judges override private conceptions or interpretations of justice, and, where necessary, society
empowers judges to order the use of physical force to
ensure the supremacy of their views. In order to validate
the supremacy of judicial interpretations over private

To do this, the law must find the best means for
effectively representing to the subjects of its legal empire
that justice is being done. In furtherance of this goal, it
uses various performative strategies, including narrative,
rhetoric, ritual, and the like. 4 Through the rational use of
these means of representation, law seeks to conjure phenomenological embodiments of the abstract concept of
justice within the courtroom. Without such representations, the concept of justice will remain abstract and
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unrecognizable, and the legal system will find it difficult
to create the impression that it is really doing justice.
The task of representing an abstract idea through
performative or visual imagery is always a Sisyphean one,
however. Members of society at large, as observers of the
legal system and the recipients of its messages about
justice, will always suspect that what is being observed is
only a substitution for the ‘‘real thing’’ — for ‘‘truth’’,
‘‘justice’’, or, more concretely, for the bygone event that
the legal system purports to be currently adjudicating.
When a judge (or other finder of fact under a
judge’s supervision) sets out to apply the law to a specific
set of facts, he or she almost never has access to the actual
event that took place, yet he or she needs to make normative determinations about that event on the basis of
the evidence in front of him or her. That ‘‘evidence’’,
however, consists entirely of the various representations
of the event that are offered to the court by witnesses
and advocates. Obviously, such testimony and exhibits
can only partially reconstruct the full complexity of the
event as it occurred. And even if the evidence could fully
reconstruct the occurrence being adjudicated, the
authoritative interpretation that the finder of fact is compelled to produce — the actual ‘‘finding of fact’’ — is
necessarily truncated, and cannot possibly detail every
shade, nuance and facet of the actual event. Therefore,
the legally found ‘‘facts’’ to which the legal system applies
the law are facially only a facsimile of the event that
purportedly is being adjudicated. This gap between the
actual and purported subjects of legal analysis — the gap
between reality and representation — tends to throw
into focus the limited ability of the law to apply justice
to actual events. Thus, the legal system has to work very
hard to present the re-creation of events in the courtroom as a direct, unmitigated view into the events as
they actually occurred. If it fails to do so, the legitimacy
of any legal decision regarding this purported reality will
be undermined. The legal system’s ability to convince us
that justice has been done (or, more accurately, that in
doing justice no injustice has been done) depends on its
ability to conceal the gaps between reality and representation.
The primary instrument law uses in this respect is
visibility — the translation of abstract adjudication into
something that can be visibly apprehended, and
accepted, by society. The more convincingly justice can
be rendered visible, the more likely it is that members of
the community will accept, even if only momentarily,
that abstract justice has been done. Thus, to the degree
the legal system can convincingly convey that it is operating upon the actual subject of its adjudication, as
opposed to a mere representation thereof, it will be able
to acquire greater legitimacy for the decisions made by
its judges.
For instance, Roman law’s institution of the legal
principle of habeas corpus improved the visibility of a
certain kind of adjudication. The meaning of the Latin
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term habeas corpus is ‘‘you may have the body’’, and it
required that the accused be brought within the space in
which the legal proceedings regarding his fate were to be
conducted. Thus, even though the points to be adjudicated involved the person’s prior actions, which of course
could not be completely re-created in the courtroom, the
law presented itself as acting upon a reality immediately
before it: The question of whether the physical body in
the room could or could not be held by the authorities.
By rephrasing the question in this manner, the law
enhances the legitimacy of its manner of adjudicating
the fate of the accused, because it appears to be grappling
directly with reality. Given its performative effectiveness,
it is no wonder that the principle of habeas corpus has
managed to survive the enormous changes Western law
has undergone since the age of the Roman Empire. 5

The status of legal procedure within the
system of visual representation
The history of the ‘‘visibility’’ of law has been much
neglected. 6 Given the importance of transforming adjudication into visible form, legal scholars should try to
develop the critical tools necessary to analyze various
legal systems’ performance of this function. Discussions
regarding judges’ use of rhetorical and narrative strategies
in their legal opinions are already prevalent in legal
scholarship, but comparatively little critical examination
has been done of the performative ways in which justice
is represented during the actual course of legal proceedings. In part, this is an explicable academic skew: Careful
analysis of judicial opinions is the main interest of legal
scholars because they are plentiful, easy to access, and
suit the textual proclivities of academics. Without questioning the importance of textual analysis, we feel it
necessary to point out that such analysis fails to capture
large swathes of legal activity. 7 We aim to rectify this
situation by focusing on the way in which law transmits
its messages during the actual process of adjudication,
with an emphasis on the means by which procedural
rules promote the visibility of justice. In embarking on
this endeavour, we draw heavily on film theory, both
because cinematic production is the primary field for the
production of visual images, and because the tools that
cinema has used to create an impression of transmitted
reality cast light on the ways in which law seeks to
obtain a similar goal.
The need to investigate the methods used to
represent justice during legal proceedings derives from
the need to broaden our perspective regarding legal performance beyond a study of written opinions. The reasoning of judges, as recorded in written opinions, is of
course of fundamental significance; however, its ability
to convince us of its basic soundness (both in general
and with respect to particular opinions) depends to a
great extent on our willingness to accept the propriety of
the proceedings that led up to the legal opinion in question.
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Take, for instance, the legal system presented in
Franz Kafka’s The Trial. Kafka imagined a legal system
that abandoned any attempt at producing representations of legitimacy during the course of legal proceedings, and that instead sought to assert its authority and
validity only after a decision had been reached. Characters simply wander the corridors of the investigation hall
without encountering any visible representations of
adjudication or symbols of ‘‘justice being done’’, until
finally they are presented with a ruling, a fait accompli. 8
Kafka’s thought experiment demonstrates the way in
which robbing the adjudicative process of its presentational and performative aspects subverts the authority
and credibility of the law. Moreover, it emphasizes the
importance of centralizing the law’s representational
efforts in the loci of authority where adjudication actually takes place (i.e., in the courts).
Legal procedure plays a unique role in shaping legal
performance. Procedure is the construct through which
an entire legal proceeding is produced (we will focus on
the nature of this production in Part II). Procedure dictates the setting in which representations of justice take
place; it determines what will occur, and in what order
and in what fashion. In this way, procedure establishes
the space in which the legal system attempts to represent
adjudication and the doing of justice. Accordingly, legal
procedure is not merely a collection of rules for facilitating effective legal decisions; it is also, and perhaps
primarily, a system for determining how one can produce effective performances within the courtroom, a
semantic field in which attorneys, witnesses, judges, and
the legal system at large seek to create meaning (justice,
truth, reliability, objectivity, etc.) through their performances. Legal procedure, from this perspective, can be
defined as a system of rules that determines the permissible means of articulation to be used within this
semantic field. To employ a term from aesthetics, one
can describe procedure as the poetics of legal proceedings.
The literal meaning of the Greek term poetics is
‘‘the art of doing’’. Following Aristotle, the term is usually
used in analyzing aesthetic semantic fields. In a more
general sense, however, a poetics is any system of rules
that delineates how meanings are generated in a particular field and why they are accepted as meaningful. 9
Poetics views a semantic field in terms of the effects it
generates in those who encounter it. Thus, a writer well
versed in literary poetics understands how to create
upon the reader the effect he or she desires.
Law also has a poetics. Through strict adherence to
the poetics of law, the legal system attempts to ensure
that the participants in a legal performance utilize the
means available to them to transmit the message that
justice is being done. 10 There are a number of recipients
of this message: The judge and jury serve as the audience
for attorneys and witnesses, while spectators, both in the
courtroom and outside it, are the audience for the legal

performance as a whole. Consider, in this regard, the
symbolic entrance of a judge or panel of judges into a
courtroom, accompanied by the voice of the bailiff and
the rising of the public to its feet. It resembles nothing so
much as the beginning of a piece of theatre whose
internal rules are defined by legal procedure.
Through the use of devices drawn from the poetics
of law, the legal system seeks to persuade observers of the
legitimacy of the way in which it does justice.
The performance of adjudication has two facets,
each of which depends upon the translation of the
abstract into the visible. First, the legal system has to
convince society that during the course of a trial, an
incident that occurred in the past, and at which neither
judge nor jury was present, was optimally re-created so
that its consequences could be adjudicated and normative strictures fairly applied. Second, the legal system has
to convince its audience, including the parties, spectators,
and commentators, that it credibly performed justice,
which means that the appropriate images of justice being
done have to have been publicly displayed. To preserve
its authority, every legal proceeding has to create within
its audience the sense that the methods used to do justice are effective, which means that the abstract form of
justice has to be convincingly translated into visual
images. If the legal system is not convincing in its depiction of abstract justice being done, it will quickly lose the
monopoly granted to it by society over the process of
defining and applying justice.

Why law and film?
Using film theory to decipher legal representation
Why law and film? 11 First, law does not function in
a vacuum. In order for its representations of ‘‘justice
being done’’ to be effective, the legal system must make
use of strategies and signifiers drawn from culture at
large. Conceptions of justice are largely socially constructed, and to this extent they rely upon generally
accepted conventions, images and ideas to derive their
meanings. 12 Such images form the framework through
which we filter and process reality. As part of this general
framework, each of us has accumulated an enormous
reservoir of audio and visual capital, comprised of hundreds of thousands of images, that influences our perceptions of justice. In our age, cinema has been one of the
primary suppliers of this symbolic capital. It is therefore
possible to speak of a certain cinematization of our
thinking about justice, a cinematization that is part of a
far broader cultural phenomenon. 13
The field of cultural production is highly decentralized. Within its borders, meanings are dynamically and
ceaselessly produced, without any clear hierarchies
between producers. 14 When the law tries to entrench the
supremacy of its interpretation of justice, it must compete with these masses of alternative meanings. Journal-
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ists and entertainers, politicians and architects, stage
directors and educators — all participate in the discourse
regarding ‘‘what is just’’. But as the most popular artistic
medium of the 20th century, the cinema has taken a
central position in the debate and has emerged as an
especially powerful generator of meaning. Just as cinema
has come to influence the products we choose to buy,
our interpersonal relationships, and our political preferences, it has come to shape our thinking about the shape
of justice.
To examine the poetics of law (i.e., the unique
methods that law employs to create its desired effect on
its audience), we have to examine whether and in what
way these methods are influenced by the dominant
poetics of our time: The poetics of film. Different systems
of poetics are in constant correspondence with each
other. 15 Unsurprisingly, the introduction and development of film, and its growing impact throughout the last
decades, has deeply influenced the poetics of other fields,
from literature and theatre to politics and education.
This has only been amplified by the rapid rise of television and the Internet, media that largely share the
imagistic vocabulary and narrative conventions of film. 16
(Other computerized devices also rely, to some degree,
on the principles of cinematic expression.) 17 Given the
importance of the language of film to contemporary
thinking generally, an examination of the interaction
between cinematic expression and legal articulation is a
prerequisite to any analysis of perceptions of justice in
the age of the moving image. And even if the importance
of the ‘‘silver screen’’ is gradually diminishing, the
advanced technologies that are replacing it still must be
interpreted through our existing epistemological framework. For the time being, we process these sophisticated
manipulations of moving images using the interpretive
strategies we have learned at the cinema.
Second, the methodological posture of law-as-film,
like other ‘‘law &’’ disciplines, offers a critical perspective
on the law that cannot be achieved from a viewpoint
inside the legal discourse. Legal academia and practice
tend to regard the deconstruction of legal language and
performance as an esoteric pursuit, and it is therefore
frequently overlooked. The result is a paucity of systematic, critical assessments of the representative functions of
legal procedure; instead, procedure is all too often
written off as a mere compilation of ‘‘the rules of the
game’’. We hope to remedy this situation, in part, by
applying the techniques developed in cinematic studies
to legal procedure.
Film’s enormous success in creating an impression
of transmitted reality quickly led critics to question the
extent to which cinematic depiction actually provides
reliable information about an object or event. Film
theory therefore deals extensively with the way in which
‘‘reality’’ is conveyed by cinematic poetics. A similar
problem is posed by legal proceedings. Legal proceedings
are a kind of controlled visual performance, and as such
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we have to examine the degree to which they contribute
to our ability to perceive actual adjudication, or whether,
perhaps, they merely serve to conceal the limits of the
law’s ability actually to do justice.
Using aesthetic theory to investigate legal discourses
is not new, of course: ‘‘law as literature’’ has long thrived
as an academic subgenre, and to a large extent it serves as
a theoretical model for the course we are proposing
here. 18 Law as literature seeks, among other things, to
examine the rhetorical and narrative means used by
judges to justify the ‘‘justness’’ of their decisions. Its primary tools are the sophisticated techniques of literary
criticism, which are well suited for adaptation to the
textual aspects of the law. 19 The emphasis on deconstructive textual analysis has helped unveil some of the
methods legal actors use to legitimize their decisions,
and has led to renewed focus on the ethical aspects of
those decisions. 20 Our proposal for an investigation of
‘‘law as film’’ is an extension of this project, wherein an
additional critical tool, film theory, is used to probe
another, non-textual aspect of adjudication, the actual
proceedings conducted in court. Although its roots go
quite deep, the emergence of ‘‘law and literature’’ as an
academic field is a relatively new phenomenon, generally
dated to the publication of James Boyd White’sThe
Legal Imagination in 1973. 21 The field is usually divided
into two categories: law as literature, which focuses on
literary readings of legal texts, and law in literature,
which focuses on depictions of law in literary works. To
date, ‘‘law and film’’ scholarship has generally paralleled
the study of law in literature, that is, it has focused on
representations of legal practice in film. We wish to focus
on the alternative perspective — namely law as film. 22
Our goal is to apply cinematic criticism to legal proceedings themselves, in order to determine how meaning
and representation are produced in the courtroom.

What does ‘‘Law as Film’’ mean?
At first glance, the substantial differences between
producing a motion picture and conducting a legal proceeding are evident. To create meaning and narrative, a
film crew uses tools — photography, editing, soundtracks, etc. — that are not available to those running a
trial. Yet it would be wrong to fetishize the technological
means employed in filmmaking. What is essential to
cinematic poetics is the attempt to bridge the gap
between reality and representation. More than any other
artistic medium, cinema tries to limit the viewer’s awareness that he or she is watching a constructed representation of reality as opposed to reality itself. Legal proceedings share this goal.
As described above, justice, indeed, must be seen to
be done: The legal system must present convincing
depictions of just adjudication if its pronouncements
regarding law and justice are to be accepted as legitimate
by society at large. To convey a message or tell a story, a
film similarly has to produce convincing images of the
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events and characters it purports to depict. The cinema’s
enormous success in doing so over the past 80 years has
made it a powerful shaper of popular conceptions of
love, beauty, virtue, and justice.
The need to create convincing visual representations of abstract ideas is thus a common component of
legal and cinematic performance. Towards this end, both
fields employ systematic poetics. Some of the devices
they use are similar: Both in the courtroom and on a
movie set, the scenery, costumes, and staging of the characters are tightly controlled. Many devices are different,
but that is not a reason to abandon the analogy. At a
conceptual level, there is a resonance between the ways
in which the legal system and the cinema approach a
common problem, and this conceptual similarity trumps
the differences in the technologies employed in the two
fields.
Phenomenological Aspects of the Cinematic and
Legal Viewing Experiences
Watching a film and attending a legal proceeding
both begin with the viewer’s entrance into a defined
performative space: A movie theatre in the first instance,
a courtroom in the second. 23 Each is a bounded space
where conduct is regulated by a set of idiosyncratic rules.
Beyond these similarities, however, is a more all encompassing one: In each arena, those charged with generating meaning seek to create a type of mimetic illusion,
and they use conceptually similar devices in order to do
so.
The status of the audience both in a movie theatre
and in the courtroom is characterized by an ambivalence
caused by its simultaneous presence and absence. In a
movie theatre, the audience and the screen are physically
present, but the events depicted on the screen are not.
Yet the visual precision of the filmed images, the impression of movement, and the addition of sound effects
often succeeds in convincing the spectator that he or she
is actually watching the filmed events as they unfold.
When successful, a film manages to efface the gaps in
time and space between the moment of photography
and the moment of screening. This effect led a writer for
the French newspaper La Poste, upon leaving the first
public cinematographic show held in Paris on
December 28, 1895, to declare: ‘‘This is life itself’’. A
review in La Nature added: ‘‘This is nature caught in the
act’’. 24
Film theorists have long engaged in an attempt to
analyze the secret behind creating images so close to the
original, to the perceived ‘‘real’’, that they prompt such
reactions. The French theorist André Bazin, one of the
first to develop the idea of the unique representational
quality of the cinematic shot, 25 wrote:
The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality
of credibility absent from all other picture making. In spite
of any objections our critical spirit may offer, we are forced
to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced,
actually re-presented, set before us . . . in time and space. 26
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In his article ‘‘The Evolution of the Language of
Cinema’’, Bazin describes the various means of expression that induce us to accept as ‘‘real’’ the images scampering by on the big screen. Most importantly, styles of
photography, such as close-ups or slow-motion shots, can
stress elements of the original event that likely would
have gone unnoticed without the intervention of the
camera. Similarly, an emphasis on the depth of the space
filmed through the use of long shots and deep focus
creates a dynamic, according to Bazin, that ‘‘brings the
spectator into a relation with the image closer to that
which he enjoys with reality’’. 27
Like films, the legal system also tries to convince us
that the procedures it employs to judge reality enable it
to reconstruct it as precisely as possible. Through the
rules of procedure, the participants in a legal proceeding
isolate a certain event from all the events with which it is
interconnected, breaking it off from the stream of history
in order to focus on a certain, defined, ‘‘relevant’’ group
of facts. Procedural and evidentiary rules limit a legal
proceeding to certain kinds of facts by insisting that
descriptions of an event be limited to certain narrators
(witnesses who are acquainted with the event at first
hand) who can only speak on certain topics (ones determined judicially ‘‘relevant’’). These rules (and others)
form an efficient framework for the narrative construction of reality. The fact of the matter is that reality
cannot be assessed without some kind of segmentation
into manageable chunks, which makes necessary the
utilization of a process for performing this editing (physical editing in the case of film; procedural limitations in
the case of the law). In order to ensure that the resulting,
edited reality is still comprehensible, additional techniques have to be used to emphasize important points
and downplay minor ones. In films, this is done through
photographic techniques such as zooms, whereas in the
courtroom, it is accomplished by procedural devices,
such as the telescopic focusing of a cross-examination,
redirect, and recross on an increasingly narrow subject
matter.
In the field of poetics, the legal system’s desire to
convey that it is reproducing reality is described as an
attempt at verisimilitude. 28 Verisimilitude is a poetic
attempt to bridge the gap between what language is
capable of expressing and the reality of the object being
described. The degree to which a semantic, rhetorical, or
narrative work succeeds in bringing the act of representation closer to its source, to minimizing the presence of
the intermediary and giving the reader/spectator an
unmediated view of the object or event being described,
is corollary to the work’s ability to give concrete form to
represented reality. Of the various media, film possesses
the highest degree of verisimilitude and the most conceptually sympathetic attitude towards attempts to eliminate the gap between representation and reality.
Consider the effect of other media. When reading a
book, a reader is required to imagine for himself or
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herself the reality represented in the text. Moreover, the
necessity of physically holding the book constantly
reminds the reader, no matter how much she emotionally succumbs to the descriptive power of the text, that
her experience of the story is mediated. Paintings are
capable of creating a fuller visual image of reality, sometimes even demonstrating a degree of photographic
realism that ‘‘freezes’’ the scene being captured. Photographs narrow the gap even further. But photographs are
unable to transmit the sense of dynamic motion or temporal passage possessed by experienced reality. Dance
can represent both time and motion, but its conceptual
approach is allegorical and not an attempt at copying
reality. Theatre, which is perhaps closest to legal performance, actually emphasizes its representational qualities
instead of effacing them. Bazin aptly describes this phenomenon in his comparison between the intentional
artificiality of the theatre and the realistic character of
the cinematic experience:
A certain artificiality, an exaggerated transformation of the
décor, is totally incompatible with that realism which is of
the essence of the cinema. The text of Molière only takes on
meaning in forest of painted canvas and the same is true of
the acting. 29

When we watch a film, on the other hand, we are meant
to feel as if we have been thrust into the reality that the
characters in the film are experiencing.
Legal verisimilitude is expressed in the legal system’s
attempts to produce for adjudication a readily recognizable re-enactment of reality. In other words, the legal
system presents itself as having created an unmediated
view onto the reality of the event being adjudicated,
thereby effacing the gaps in space and time between its
occurrence and its re-presentation in the courtroom. 30 In
its strivings for verisimilitude, the law tries to minimize
the fact that neither judge nor jury actually has had
unmediated experience with the event they are being
asked to evaluate.
‘‘Presence’’ is experienced in both the court and the
cinema on two levels. On one level, a film’s audience and
a trial’s participants and spectators are conscious of their
presence in a particular, defined space, be it movie theatre or courtroom. On a second, more important level,
spectators of both films and legal proceedings are asked
to assume or imagine their presence at the events being
depicted (or, perhaps more accurately, to ignore their
non-presence).
Yet it is impossible for a spectator to remain completely incognizant of his or her absence from the events
being depicted, despite his or her presence at their depiction. The tension between these two levels of presence
— the physical and the virtual — and their idiosyncratic
relationship is one of the overlapping points between the
cinematic and legal experiences, between the experience
of watching a movie and observing a legal proceeding.
In neither case is a spectator able to translate his or
her sense of ‘‘presence’’ at the events being depicted into

an active involvement with the events themselves. No
matter how strongly an audience member experiences
the events of a film, the means of representation — the
screen, his or her position in the audience, the projection
equipment — frustrate engagement and create estrangement. This estranging effect reminds the spectator that
he or she cannot overcome the fact that what he or she
pretends to be ‘‘experiencing’’ is merely a documentation of something that took place at another place and
time (i.e., it highlights the fact that the film is an attempt
at representation, not a conduit to an alternate reality).
Like the audience in a movie theatre, the spectators
at a legal proceeding are powerless to intervene in the
performance before them. In this sense, legal performances have more in common with films than with theatre, which might, at first glance, seem a more logical
performative model. The cinematic medium does not
allow the spectator any meaningful contact with the
characters in the film; he or she is completely estranged
from them. In the theatre, on the other hand, the audience’s reaction is an essential part of the theatrical experience, and meaning is generated though a process of give
and take between performers and observers. 31 Law, like
film but unlike theatre, seals off the performance from
the audience, thereby estranging viewers from the representational process.
Film mandates estrangement through technical
means, whereas the estrangement of mere spectators to a
legal proceeding is normative. In both cases, however, a
well-defined barrier is maintained between the spectator
and the events being documented. From a phenomenological point of view, the virtual presence of the represented reality seems to be intense, but the inability to
intervene in the narrative reminds the spectator of the
gap between the representation and the real. A spectator
in the movie theatre or the courtroom cannot leap to the
assistance of a character in trouble. Thus, the separation
of the audience from the performance deepens the spectators’ sense that they lack control over the events being
represented. Instead, such power remains firmly in the
hands of whoever controls the means of representation.
In a court of law, the barrier between spectators and
participants is reinforced both physically and procedurally. Unlike in a Broadway theatre, the public is allowed
only very limited active involvement in the performance,
and thus any criticisms that might undermine the legitimacy of the legal process are silenced. Booing and clapping are not tolerated. The reconstruction of reality is
conducted exclusively on the witness stand, according to
the rules of legal procedure. The judge controls the
means of representation, and he or she regulates the
access of the other participants (the witnesses and attorneys) to those means. 32 Even if a spectator with firsthand
knowledge of the events being adjudicated wishes to
physically appear in the courtroom and participate in
their re-creation, he or she will not be allowed to do so
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unless he or she appears as a witness in the manner
dictated by the rules of procedure, those same rules that
make up the poetics of representing reality within the
courtroom. 33 Any attempt to breach the procedurally
mandated separation between spectators and participants will result in physical removal from the courtroom.
As a result, in both law and film the audience is
present in the location of representation as seers, but is
not itself seen. 34 In spite of the concreteness and vividness of the event being observed, the audience is nevertheless absent from it.
This experience of simultaneous presence and
absence also characterizes our fraught awareness that
there are both onstage and offstage components of the
representational act. This awareness prevents the suspension of disbelief from being total in both law and film.
Film, like law, tries to reproduce an event that actually
took place in another place and time. The spectator
knows, however, that the images in front of him or her
are not merely spontaneously captured representations
of another reality, but are instead the results of a complex production process aimed at creating precisely the
performance now being viewed. Consequently, in spite
of the considerable effectiveness of the mimetic illusion,
the audience cannot entirely avoid the realization that
the media’s ability to transmit reality is ever limited by
the boundaries of the frame. In the case of law, the frame
is metaphorical and the boundaries are procedural. From
the moment the complaint or statement of claim is
served, through discovery, the hearing of evidence, and
the final summations by the parties, the event at issue is
framed, edited and reduced so that it fits within the
boundaries recognized by the legal system. The narrative
that results, and that forms the basis for whatever normative adjudication occurs, is constructed by combining
into a linear sequence the reductive descriptions that
emerge from the colander of legal procedure, which separates legally operative ‘‘facts’’ from the rest of reality.
The Performative Character of Legal Proceedings
The developing scholarship on law in film can be
very helpful to our project of investigating law as film,
because films themselves cast an experienced cinematographic eye on legal proceedings and thereby highlight
many of their performative aspects.
Whenever one enters a court of law, even if for the
very first time, one finds oneself in an environment that
is immediately familiar. The importance of visibility to
the legal process, and the commonality of the visual
images that have been adopted to represent adjudication,
contribute to the fact that visual representations of concepts such as ‘‘law’’ or ‘‘court’’ are easily identifiable
across cultural and geographical boundaries. 35
The visual power of the familiar icons of legal proceedings, such as the dark robes of the judges, the
podium upon which the judge sits, often under a symbol
of the state, and the ceremonial entrance of the judge
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after an announcement by the bailiff, is somewhat baffling, however. What makes these particular accessories
such effective visual cues of ‘‘justice’’? Why does the
wearing of wigs in Britain, or of robes in Europe, so
vividly represent adjudication and the exposure of truth?
How is it that these apparently anachronistic visual symbols have managed to survive within the law’s system of
visual representation?
Our thesis is that societal familiarity with these symbols assists in the establishment of a link between
observable legal proceedings and abstract concepts of
justice and adjudication. Legal proceedings acquire
authoritative status by, among other things, conforming
to societal expectations of the way legal proceedings are
supposed to appear. Such expectations dwell in our collective consciousness and largely have been shaped by
visual images taken from popular culture.
Accordingly, the experience of observing a legal proceeding is interpreted by reference to our pre-existing
visual conceptions of what justice and adjudication look
like. One of the main sources of these conceptions is the
thousands of images that depict ‘‘doing justice’’ in films.
The intriguing conclusion, the implications of which we
shall discuss in detail in the second half of this article, is
that legal proceedings strive to resemble cinematic representations of legal proceedings, in order to thereby
impart the message that they are, in fact, engaged in the
legitimate process of doing justice.
This conclusion is compatible with scholarship that
concentrates on representations of the legal system in
films, and in fact emerges from many of the studies that
have been published on the subject. 36 To a certain
extent, it constitutes the raison d’être for engaging in
such studies as a form of legal, as opposed to merely
sociological, scholarship, because interpretations of law
in film are only legally meaningful if they in turn inform
the functioning of the actual legal system. But analysis of
representations of law in film only addresses the manner
in which society perceives and processes images of law. It
leaves the other side of the equation — the ways in
which the legal system generates meaning through the
manipulation of visual images — unaddressed. It is to
address this topic that a study of law as film is pertinent.
Let us take, for example, a key concept in cinematic
theory, the concept of iconography. 37 In film theory,
iconography describes the collection of visual images
that have acquired cultural and symbolic values that
exceed the bounds of any specific film. 38 Iconography
fulfils an important function in the identification and
definition of genre films. The attractiveness of genre
films derives to a great extent from their use of familiar
components that have become trademarks of the genre.
Legal proceedings also rely on the iconographic
status of certain elements to provide each legal performance with a general meaning that exceeds the bounds of
the specific event. Décor, costumes, and particular forms
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of character delineation signify that a particular legal
proceeding is of the genre ‘‘legal proceedings’’.
The décor of a law court includes a number of
standard components. An elevated podium usually sits in
the middle of the scene, with the judge or judges sitting
behind a desk from which their upper bodies emerge,
usually wrapped in robes. This presentation borrows
from cinematic conventions in order to generate certain
meanings and hierarchical relationships. For example,
filming a character from a low angle usually stresses the
character’s commanding presence. In Westerns, this
angle iconographically signals the great strength of the
hero or the enormous wickedness of the villain. Similarly, the lines of perspective in the courtroom prescribe
to a considerable degree the way the scene is received.
The elevated, central positioning of the judge renders
him or her into an emblem of power, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy for his or her decisions. The symmetrical lines stretching from the judge to the opposing
parties presents a visual image of the objectivity desired
of the legal system, epitomizing the normative evenhandedness expected of the judge.
In most cases, the image of the judge is itself iconic.
He or she fulfils a function in the concrete legal production being observed, but also serves as a recurring symbol
of justice in legal performances. His or her appearance is
therefore often as performatively meaningful as his or
her actions. 39 Furthermore, the judge is typically perceived not as an individual with his or her own peculiarities, personal qualities, and private preferences, but rather
as the embodiment of the iconic figure of the judge,
exactly as a character in a film can be readily identified
as the ‘‘hero’’ or the ‘‘good cop’’ or the ‘‘sheriff’’. Where
judges wear gowns, the uniform helps to obscure the
contours of the judges’ private personalities and increases
their ability to project the desired effects of impartiality
and abstraction, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the
act of judgment.
In the previous subsection, we explored the means
by which the events being adjudicated in a legal proceeding are represented so as to conceal the absence of
the judge, jury, and spectators from the events themselves. In this section, we have taken a step back and
analyzed the devices employed by the legal system to
conform its performances to societal expectations of
what adjudication looks like. In any given legal proceeding these two types of representation converge into
a unity that endeavours to express the message that justice is being done, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy and
authority of the legal system and contributing to social
stability.
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Part II: Changes in the Cinematic
System of Representation and the
Implications for Legal Procedure

O

ur starting premise has been that society has
invested the legal system with the authority to do
justice, and that in order to protect this authority, the law
is required to show that justice is being done. This
requires legal performances that conform to commonly
shared perceptions of justice. Because film held a central
place in the construction of these commonly held perceptions throughout much of the twentieth century, law
tended to choose cinematic devices as the most effective
way of achieving the desired effect. As we move from a
filmic culture to a digital one, however, those devices are
beginning to lose their effectiveness. In order to understand developments in contemporary legal practice, then,
we must also come to grips with ongoing changes in
contemporary visual culture.

The Age of the Moving Image
One of the earliest and most influential analyses of
film’s effect on viewers is found in Walter Benjamin’s
essay, ‘‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’’, 40 which describes the dialectical nature of
visual representation and its function as a parameter for
the evaluation of social reality. Benjamin’s work drew on
the Frankfurt school of thought, which emphasized the
profound social influence of popular art in the formation
of the political consciousness of culture consumers. 41
Indeed, his discussion of the influence of cinematic
expression on social perceptions extends beyond the aesthetic to the political. Benjamin notes film’s powerful
ability to represent visual reality as compared with the
artistic mediums that preceded it. But he warns that
these apparently realistic qualities of film threaten to
distort our perception of reality, and to lead us to suspend our critical faculties rather than helping us to analyze the reality that is being reproduced.
Benjamin therefore speaks of the violence of the
cinematic medium. This violence is revealed by the
ambivalence inherent in film. On the one hand, the
precision with which the changing images appear on the
big screen correlates highly with our normal modes of
perception. 42 On the other hand, the object being
observed is nothing but the artificial result of complex
processes of production. The close similarities between
the way in which cinematic expression and ‘‘everyday
life’’ are perceived make it difficult for the observer of a
film to grasp and maintain a necessary critical distance.
In other words, when watching a film, it is difficult to
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hold on to our underlying skepticism about the reliability of the intermediating act of representation. The
apparent similarity of the film-viewing experience to
unmediated perception does not force the viewer to give
pause so that he or she can reflect critically on the
images being transmitted. As Benjamin writes:
Let us compare the screen on which a film unfolds with the
canvas of a painting. The painting invites the spectator to
contemplation; before it the spectator can abandon himself
to his associations. Before the movie frame he cannot do so.
No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already
changed . . . The spectator’s process of association in view of
these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden
change. This constitutes the shock effect of the film . . . 43

According to Benjamin, sequences of moving pictures distract the mind and impair one’s ability to
develop valid assessments and judgments. Kafka maintained a similar position. 44 Both regarded films as a novel
mechanism for restricting perception and channeling it
in a certain direction, to the exclusion of all others. Both
of them, in fact, stressed film’s tendency to block direct
contact with reality. Time has confirmed Benjamin’s
misgivings regarding the use of films by interested parties and classes; some would say that he actually underestimated the threat.
In any event, there is no doubt that the dawning of
the age of cinema fundamentally increased the importance of visual representation in every sphere of life. The
visual image has become a central component in the
way in which we process reality. The interdependency
between poll ratings and policy making, or violence and
aesthetics, 45 are examples. Nevertheless, it seems that the
extreme effects that Kafka and Benjamin predicted have
not fully come to pass with respect to film itself, even
though the seeds of such effects are inherent within the
medium. 46 Instead, both authors read like prophets of
the simulacra phenomenon that came to be described
decades afterward in relation to later, follow-on technologies such as television, video, and the Internet.
These technologies enhanced and improved the
ubiquitous systems of visual representation that cinema
previously had placed at the centre of cultural consciousness. Dialectically, these novel technologies simultaneously reduced the value of visual representation as a valid
epistemological criterion, a process that has come to be
called the virtualization of reality.
Benjamin identified the seeds of this process in the
filmic culture that gave birth to the age of the moving
image. By 1960, the art critic E.H. Gombrich had already
described the phenomenon in full bloom. Gombrich
writes:
Never before has there been an age like ours when the
visual image was so cheap in every sense of the word. We
are surrounded and assailed by posters and advertisements,
by comics and magazine illustrations. We see aspects of
reality represented on the television screen and in the
cinema, on postage stamps and on food packages . . . I think
that the victory and vulgarization of representational skills
create a problem for both the historian and the critic. 47

Gombrich, like Benjamin and Kafka, describes the distorting effect and illusionary power of visual representation. 48 The ever-increasing quantity and quality of
images has acutely disrupted the epistemological value
that we can ascribe to those images as a representation of
reality. When our perception of the world is shaped so
extensively through the filter of visual culture, such a
complete and sophisticated mechanism of representation is created that our ability to interpret visual images
is not only undermined (as suggested by Benjamin and
Gombrich), but nullified. With the advent of ever more
technologically sophisticated means for representing
‘‘reality’’, the distortion between signifier and signified
has reached such enormous proportions that it is impossible to differentiate between the two. The dialectical
tension foreseen by Benjamin is now being experienced
on a massive scale. This condition is expressed by reference to the concept of the simulacra.

From the Moving Image to the Simulacra
The term ‘‘simulacrum’’ (Latin for image, shadow,
or mask) is borrowed from Plato’s metaphor of the
cave. 49 Plato’s cave dwellers see shadows on the walls and
imagine them to be the only realities. They lack all access
to the source of the images (which is outside the cave),
and therefore perceive these reflections not as mere representations of reality, but as reality itself.
Following Plato, our ability to recognize the essential nature of justice turns on our ability to scrutinize
images of justice, whether created by law or by popular
culture, and to identify the degree to which they reflect
and participate in the abstract concept of justice. The
postmodernist claim is that the current uncontrolled
abundance of representations has cloaked the epistemological lighthouse that Plato posited as standing independent of these representations, making it impossible to
evaluate their legitimacy and validity.
The concept of the simulacrum was developed by
several thinkers, including Jameson, 50 Baudrillard, 51 and
Deleuze & Guattari. 52 It describes contemporary culture
as a continuous flow of images or copies ‘‘whose relation
to the model has become so attenuated that it can no
longer properly be said to be a copy’’. 53 The condition of
simulacra is complemented by the erosion of verisimilitude.
This can be clearly recognized in film. The digital
revolution has made it possible to create imitations of
‘‘reality’’ that were not previously possible. The power of
cinema to suspend disbelief and produce verisimilitude
has passed beyond anything that previously was possible.
Yet the ability to use computer simulation to create
visual effects that until now could only be envisaged by
the imagination — to reproduce ‘‘realities’’ that do not,
and cannot, exist in reality — actually distances us from
verisimilitude. In commenting on this phenomenon,
Baudrillard noted that technological developments in
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contemporary cinema erase cinematographic illusion
almost to the point of disappearance. 54 In an interview
conducted in 1993, he added: ‘‘The more things you add
to make things real, to achieve absolute realistic verisimilitude, perhaps the further you stray from the secret of
cinema’’. 55
The simulacra first appeared as a concept in art
criticism, but soon spread to popular culture. The transference of the experience of artistic observation from
defined spatial areas (museums, concert halls) to
domestic spaces, first identified by Benjamin, lies behind
the wide social implications of the simulacra condition.
When the primary locus of the moving image was transferred from the public cinema hall to the private home
television screen, the simulacra penetrated into the realm
of private, domestic experience. As a result, the uncontrolled torrent of visual images now spills into every area
of our lives, influencing our constructions and reconstructions of nearly every concept. Inevitably, our notions
of justice — and the legal system’s ability to provide it —
are caught up in the flow.
The time has come to examine how the legal
system, as a major producer of cultural meaning, has
absorbed and internalized the simulacra condition. How
has legal procedure, the poetics of performative adjudication, grappled with the Sisyphean task of representing
justice in an age in which notions of visual representation are undergoing such dramatic changes?

The legal implications of cultural
developments: How the transition from
the age of the moving image to the
culture of simulacra has influenced visual
representations of adjudication
Law has always needed to render itself visible, and it
uses the rules of legal procedure to govern the manner in
which it does so. Legal proceedings purport to re-create
in the courtroom an event that occurred at another place
and time so that the judge and jury can ‘‘look’’ upon it
and evaluate its normative aspects. Those same proceedings simultaneously produce images of themselves that
comport with societal conceptions of what adjudication
looks like, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the legal
system’s decisions. We have proposed that at a certain
level of abstraction the cinema has similar objectives
(with a greater stress on aesthetic production and a wider
range of subject matter), which it attempts to achieve
through recourse to particular technical and poetic
means.
The legal system was developing methods for
effacing the gap between representation and reality hundreds of years before film was invented, but the technological capabilities of film allow it to achieve a level of
verisimilitude far beyond the capacity of law. Moreover,
the popularity of cinema and its profound social influence have made systems of visual representation into an
increasingly dominant component in our structuring of
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reality. At first this process suited the social interests of
law, because it enhanced the legal system’s ability to use
visual, ceremonial, and narrative representations of
reality in order to assert its own legitimacy. In other
words, the emergence of filmic culture originally promoted the project of verisimilitude in law.
Changes in patterns of consumption of moving
images have led to a diminishment of the verisimilitude
effect, however. The profusion of images racing across
television, video and computer screens has led to
profound changes in the meanings people ascribe to the
representations appearing before their eyes. The
foregrounded artificiality of many of these images, along
with their sheer number, has made the status of a visual
representation as a reliable indicator of reality ever more
doubtful. Seeing is no longer believing.
The Internet increases the tension between images
and their representative capacity even further. Exposure
to the continuous and ever-increasing flow of information available on the Internet results in a loss of the
ability to distinguish or define specific sections of significance, 56 or to endow them with moral and emotional
meaning. In a culture that is flooded with data that does
not coalesce into narratives, that is inundated by an endless stream of images of images, the ability to formulate
normative positions is undermined. 57
The gradual shift from a culture of verisimilitude to
a culture of simulacra threatens the legal system’s ability
to continue using visual images to create legitimacy. Law
is no longer on equal footing with other producers of
meaning in the cultural sphere. In the world of simulacra, we are flooded with courtroom dramas, with television channels devoted entirely to ceaseless screenings
of legal deliberations and simulated legal deliberations,
and to innumerable representations and representations
of representations of the law on the Internet. The quaint
legal performances put on in the courtroom by the legal
system simply cannot compete. Therefore, our commonly shared perceptions of justice and adjudication are
constructed with ever increasing predominance from
cultural representations of the adjudicative process,
rather than from the visual representations of that process performed by the legal system itself. The result is a
subversion of verisimilitude.
As a result, the law’s monopoly on authoritative
interpretations of justice is gradually eroding. This transformation parallels and echoes a century-long cultural
shift that accelerated at the end of the twentieth century,
wherein the loci of production of meanings shifted from
defined, bordered spaces such as courtrooms, cinemas, or
museums, to decentralized spaces largely devoid of fixed
interpretive hierarchies. The first kind of cultural production is characterized by the autonomy and authority
retained by specialized producers of meaning within
their defined fields. Contemporary, decentralized production, on the other hand, yields a wealth of representations that appear everywhere and at all times, but
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without any structural hierarchies to aid in the process of
decipherment. This sumptuousness subverts the barrier
between reality and image, undermines the inter-institutional balance of power, and subverts the exclusivity of
‘‘legal’’ justice. It is no wonder then that even legal
scholars have come to realize the necessity of using cinematic themes to develop new moral sensitivities and
guidelines appropriate to this new environment. 58
The following section will examine some practical
implications of the conditions we have been describing.
We maintain that a realization of the resonance between
legal and cinematic expression can be used to develop
innovative critical thinking about the intersection
between visual representations of adjudication and the
actual process of doing justice. In this light we will
explore the parallel erosion of verisimilitude and the
normative status of procedural rules in the courtroom.
We will then discuss two well-known representations of procedural justice in criminal law, the Miranda
warning and the warrant requirement, both of which,
we believe, developed out of a belief that visual representation serves as an effective epistemological criterion — a
belief derived, in large part, from the cinematic enterprise. The recent erosion in the normative standing of
the Miranda warning and the warrant requirement, we
believe, has similarly been influenced by the erosion of
verisimilitude in visual culture more generally.

The Miranda Warning and the Warrant
Requirement — The Blurring of
Procedural Representations
The Miranda warning 59 and the warrant requirement 60 are exclusionary rules that prevent evidence that
is unconstitutionally obtained from being offered into
evidence. Evidence so obtained, or evidence discovered
based on information so obtained, is described as the
‘‘fruit of the poisonous tree’’. 61
Exclusionary rules elevate, in certain circumstances,
procedural fairness over results-oriented justice. This
favouring of procedural fairness can be described in
terms of the legal system’s need to convince society that
the means it uses to achieve justice are legitimate. In
order to do that, law has to convince us that the recreation of the events to be adjudicated that occurs in
the courtroom provides the judge and jury with an
unmediated glimpse into the reality of those events,
rather than merely presenting a speculative representation of past events to which neither the judge nor the
jury has any direct access. When the legal system prioritizes procedure over what would appear to be the merits,
it is motivated by the concern that has been the subject
of this article: The need to create convincing visual representations of adjudication in order to legitimize the
system as a whole. A legal system that strictly upholds
exclusionary rules may occasionally sacrifice the accuracy
of some of its results by choosing, as a matter of policy, to
block certain reconstructions of reality from entering the
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courtroom, 62 but such a legal system will also be
sheathed in an aura of verisimilitude attributable to the
presumed trustworthiness of the narratives that it creates
for purposes of adjudication. By ensuring that only those
narratives that strictly follow the rules of legal poetics (i.e.,
those that are produced according to the rules of legal
procedure) are performed before it, the legal system can
portray itself as only dealing with ‘‘facts’’ (or, to put it
more obliquely, with unmediated transmissions of
reality).
When a movie director tries to create an effect of
verisimilitude (i.e., when he or she tries to narrow the
audience’s awareness of the gaps between reality and its
cinematic representation), he or she uses visual devices
and cues (such as camera movements and editing
sequences) appropriate to cinematic poetics. The legal
system uses procedural rules to the same effect. The
American legal system takes great pains to ensure that
evidence that is obtained in a way that might arouse
suspicions as to the accuracy of the re-creation being
performed in the courtroom is not offered. Just as unexpected editing or the inclusion of the film crew in the
background of a scene would ruin the effect of verisimilitude in a movie by calling attention to the gaps between
reality and representation, a failure to follow the rules of
legal poetics would subvert the notion that what is being
watched and analyzed in the courtroom is ‘‘reality.’’
At a certain point, however, this obsession with
formal proceduralism came to be seen as excessive (in
both law and film). The preference for procedural justice
and realism over ‘‘essential’’ justice and truth began to
seem empty, an undeserved favouring of form over content. Strict adherence to procedure, originally adopted as
a way of ensuring the system’s legitimacy, became,
instead, a threat to it.
We earlier noted that film’s ever-increasing technological ability to produce apparently realistic images,
which was once its source of epistemological validity,
eventually led to widespread suspicion of the credibility
of filmic depictions. A similar dialectic can be observed
with respect to the law. The tendency to sacrifice resultsoriented justice on the altar of procedural purity — a
phenomenon we have described in terms of the necessity of adhering strictly to the rules of legal poetics in
order to maintain the illusion of verisimilitude — began
to arouse wide spread criticism. 63 These critics argued
that the American legal system had stretched the maxim
that ‘‘justice must be seen to be done’’ too far, to the
extent, in fact, that the representation of justice had
become more important than the actual doing of justice.
Such criticism damaged the very legitimacy that the legal
system had tried to obtain through its emphasis on clear
representations of societal expectations of just adjudication in the first place. This damage resulted from the
inevitable eruption of the tension between representation and reality that occurs when dedication to the
means of production goes unchecked, leading to an over-
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emphasis on procedure, or technology, for their own
sakes, rather than for the sake of the production of a
convincing portrait of reality. 64
Chronologically, the ‘‘age of verisimilitude’’ in the
cinema, which began in the second quarter of the past
century and reached its height in the third quarter, overlaps almost exactly with the golden age of procedural
justice established by the Warren Court. 65 These years
witnessed both strict enforcement of the warrant
requirement and the formulation and rigorous application of the Miranda warning. There is also a remarkable
affinity between the subsequent erosion of faith in cinematic verisimilitude, and the decline and fall of legal
proceduralism.
The Miranda Warning
The Supreme Court’s 1966 ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona, 66 which established the famous ‘‘ Miranda
warning’’, was the centerpiece of a line of decisions that
dealt with the admissibility of statements by suspects
under interrogation. 67 Justice Warren’s majority opinion
provided a specific formulation of the warning that
henceforth had to be recited to suspects before they
could be questioned. Because it is quoted so frequently
in films and on television, the holding is well known
even among laymen:
[T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 68

If we try to ignore our kitsch-like familiarity with
Miranda from popular culture, we can probe these
words for the motivation that lay behind the ruling.
Warren’s opinion, it seems to us, reflects a belief in the
power of clear verbal and visual messages to authenticate
any resulting narratives (here, the information provided
by the suspect after he or she has received the Miranda
warning). Warren uses rhetoric that emphasizes the visibility of legal and procedural safeguards: He demands
the performance of a visual warning along the lines of
what he has written — almost a line reading. 69 And he
demands such a warning because it shows the legal
system acting fairly, thereby reinforcing the idea that it is
capable of doing justice. 70 For Warren, this visibility was
more important than the superior information that
might be extracted from the suspect using other, more
covert, means.
[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether
the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning
being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education,
intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be
more than speculation; a warning is a clear-cut fact. 71

Mandatory issuance by the police of Miranda warnings
creates a situation in which judges and juries do not have
to speculate on the voluntary nature of statements made
by suspects under interrogation: A fact-specific inquiry
that inevitably highlights the fact that neither judge nor

jury was at the scene. Instead, what is presented to judge
and jury is a simple visual image: The playing out of the
‘‘warning-giving’’ scene scripted by Justice Warren. Legal
scholars have long debated this preference for a bright
line rule over more subtle tests for evaluating the trustworthiness of information provided by suspects under
interrogation. 72 To comment intelligently on the matter,
one has to take into account not just the suspect’s rights
but the legal system’s interest in the performative nature
of legal proceedings.
A familiar poetic device in cinematic language is the
ordering of scenes so as to indicate that a character
obtained information in one scene that is relevant in a
later scene. A mere alternation of camera shots, with no
inherent meaning, builds, pursuant to cinematic poetics,
into a comprehensible narrative. The Miranda warning
dictates a narrative in a similar fashion.
Critics of Miranda have argued that rather than protecting the rights of the interrogated, the warning actually threatens them, because even suspects who have no
understanding of those rights are deemed to have comprehended them if they received the warning. But from a
performative perspective, Miranda fills an important
function: The clear visual spectacle it proscribes, in
which the suspect takes place in a scene in which he or
she receives certain information, arouses narrative expectations among its audience (the judge, the jury, or the
spectators in the courtroom) that are not easily dispelled.
There is thus a tension inherent in Miranda. The visually
evocative scene dictated by the Warren Court enhances
the legitimacy of the legal system on one level, because
the system appears to be complying with narratives of
fairness and justice, but in the process, the actual doing
of justice is rendered more difficult, because the narrative
pull of conventions like the giving of the Miranda
warning is so strong that it threatens to obscure, rather
than elucidate, what actually happened.
In the age of the simulacra, the representative power
and visual spectacle of the Miranda warning has led to its
endless reproduction in cinematic and televised depictions of arrest. When we see someone being read his or
her rights, we immediately draw the conclusion ‘‘that
person has been arrested’’. Through sheer repetition, the
Miranda warning has gone from being a legal performance that enhances legal legitimacy through the creation
of an image that complies with societal expectations of
justice, to a progenitor of simulacra. There are now so
many images of Miranda floating around that as a signifier, it no longer points to a particular, intended signified
(in this case, that the suspect understands his or her
rights and can reliably provide information under interrogation).
While the devaluation of the epistemic reliability of
the Miranda warning is but one manifestation of a more
general undercutting of visual representations’ status as
authoritative indicators of the truth, from a dialectical
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perspective this is not the only result of the cultural
overflow of Miranda images. Images of Miranda are often
used in films to deconstruct and expose the gap between
representation and reality that the legal system originally
used Miranda to conceal. Miranda was originally
imposed as a way of indicating that the legal system acts
justly. In films, however, we often see a character who we
know to be innocent being read his or her rights as a
way of indicating that he or she is being arrested. In
these instances, the familiar visual image of the Miranda
warning sends the image not that the legal system is
legitimate and applies normative evaluations only to
reality, but instead that it is fallible and undeserving of its
monopoly over interpretations and pronouncements of
justice. Cinematic depictions of Miranda are thus used to
set forth alternative interpretive hierarchies, in which
other conceptions of justice compete for authority with
the official ones produced by the legal system.
Along with decreased confidence in the representational capacity of the Miranda warning has come a series
of efforts to chip away at Miranda itself. This began with
Congress’s passage of a law that sought to circumvent the
decision. According to the law, the admissibility of statements made by suspects would depend entirely upon a
holistic determination of whether such statements were
made voluntarily. 73 This legislative attempt has been followed by a series of judicial decisions, creating a string of
exceptions and limitations to the Warren Court’s original ruling. 74
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prerequisite if the fruits of a police search are to be
offered into evidence, ‘‘to a procedural requirement
sometimes acknowledged and rarely enforced. Current
fourth amendment doctrine is so muddy, and the
Court’s message is so deprecatory of fourth amendment
rights’’. 85
The status of the warrant requirement (like the
status of the Fourth Amendment as a whole) has been
further weakened in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. 86
The warrant requirement, like the Miranda
warning, dictates that a certain scene be played out for
purposes of narrative continuity and verisimilitude. Just
as a film director uses particular camera shots and cinematic devices to establish the trustworthiness of a given
character, the law mandates that performers act out certain scenes in order to create an effect of verisimilitude.
According to legal poetics (i.e., the rules of legal procedure), information obtained during a search must be
preceded by the obtaining of a warrant in order to be
authentic. Thus, the audience in a courtroom has a
means for evaluating whether the events being re-created
in a legal proceeding are a glimpse onto a past ‘‘reality’’
or a mere fabrication. Pursuant to the rules of legal
poetics, the evaluation turns on the existence of a preceding scene in which the authorities obtained a warrant. 87

. . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 80

Procedural rules’ ability to shape the ways in which
expression is produced in the courtroom creates ambivalences, however. Systems of poetics, like other systems of
rules, not only proscribe ways of producing meaning, but
also block other ways of doing so. Thus, steps that serve
the purposes of producing procedural justice and
performative legitimacy likely obstruct the production of
other kinds of meaning, such as results-based justice. In
order to obscure the costs of such choices, the legal
system employs noble-sounding maxims, such as ‘‘justice
must be seen to be done.’’ But in today’s nonhierarchical,
virulently multi-polar visual culture, it is impossible for
the legal system to control the images of itself that it
transmits to the public, including the visual representations of adjudication that it formerly used to establish its
own legitimacy. The proliferation of representations of
the warrant requirement in popular culture, where they
cannot be controlled by the legal system, threatens to
expose the gaps between reality and representation that
the legal system itself struggled to conceal, as well as the
associated costs.

Beginning in the 1970s, and with increasing rapidity
during the 1980s and 1990s, a gradual erosion began to
take place in the rule established by Weeks, Gouled,
Mapp and Katz . 81 Matters soon reached the point where
critics claimed the warrant requirement ‘‘is theory, not
fact’’, 82 that ‘‘[t]he per se rule fails to reflect judicial practice’’, 83 and that ‘‘in practice warrants are the exception
rather than the rule’’. 84 Over the course of the last 30
years, then, a warrant has gone from being an absolute

From the 1960s onward, audiences have been frequently confronted with depictions of the warrant
requirement in Hollywood films, including many scenes
that cast doubt on the reliability of evidence procured
during a search undertaken ‘‘according to law’’. There
are also innumerable scenes in which criminals block
the authorities by demanding a warrant; determined
policemen take the law into their own hands and ignore
the warrant requirement in order to serve a higher good;

The Warrant Requirement
The warrant requirement arises from the Fourth
Amendment to the American Constitution. 75 Although
the Fourth Amendment makes no mention of the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by illegal means, the
Supreme Court held as early as 1914 that the amendment compelled exclusion of evidence procured unconstitutionally. 76 Seven years later, in Gouled v. United
States, the Court made a comprehensive ruling that evidence obtained through illegal searches or seizures conducted by federal authorities was inadmissible in federal
court. 77 In 1961 the ruling was extended to the states. 78
During the 1960s the warrant-based exclusionary rule
attained its broadest sweep. 79 For example, in Katz v.
United States, the Court announced that:
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smooth-talking attorneys save dangerous criminals from
being convicted by arguing that a warrant was lacking;
judges hurriedly sign unjustified orders and allow for the
invasion of innocent people’s privacy (while other judges
obstruct hard-working cops by making them fill out red
tape). Legal proceedings never play out the consequences
of the warrant requirement, which take place outside the
bounds of a legal performance, but films do so with
startling frequency. And those consequences can be subversive.
Cinematic representations of the warrant requirement track the legal evolution of the warrant requirement. The warrant requirement is gradually being downgraded and eroded by the courts 88 as part and parcel of
the general erosion of procedural and evidentiary protections originally enacted to promote legal visibility. Simultaneously, depictions of the warrant requirement in
films, on television, and on the Internet increasingly
question its efficacy and reveal its costs, disputing, in the
process, the interpretive authority of the legal system
(which is tied up with the legitimacy it gains through the
persuasive power of legal performances governed by
rules like the warrant requirement). Thus, the legal
system’s authoritative status as the primary producer of
‘‘justice’’ in society begins to be called into question.
Summary
The shifting status of the Miranda warning and the
warrant requirement demonstrate how changes in visual
cultural generally are reintegrated into the legal system,
disrupting the system’s ability to control the production
of meanings in legal proceedings, a theatre of performance in which it had long perceived of itself as acting
autonomously. The inquiry we have conducted into the
interdependent dialectics of visual representation in film
and legal procedure has enabled us to identify some of
the pressing challenges facing the legal system as it
attempts to preserve its authority and legitimacy in a
radically changing world. The disintegration of the
Miranda warning and the warrant requirement as epistemologically reliable devices supports our thesis that
traditional legal poetics — expressed through the rules of
legal procedure — lack the ability to continue to function as an effective system of visual representation.
Where a visual representation once implied verisimilitude (i.e., reliable information regarding the reality
depicted by the representation), visual representations
have now come to be seen as mere images or simulacra,
signifiers that only point to other signifiers and bear no
connection to any reality or source. As a result of these
changes, legal poetics — like cinematic poetics — have
difficulty in producing representations that are considered legitimate or authoritative by contemporary audiences. People no longer buy into the maxim that seeing
is believing.
In shaping the Miranda warning and the warrant
requirement, the rules of legal poetics proved themselves
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flexible enough to favour the creation of visual representations when society demanded them as a guarantor of
accurate depictions of reality. The slow but inexorable
proliferation of Miranda and warrant-requirement
images has changed them, however, from mimetic
devices to pastiche, 89 from rules that promote visibility to
those that function as simulacra. As a result, the law has
had to adjust in turn, both in its doctrinal treatment of
the exclusionary rule and in the methods it uses to perform convincing depictions of adjudication and justice.
We take no normative position as to the developments we have been describing. Our point throughout
has been that there is an interplay between filmic culture
and legal procedure that long has been overlooked, and
that can help us inquire into and explain developments
that otherwise might appear puzzling or random. Further inquiry along these lines can strengthen our understanding of the goals of law and the methods available
for achieving them, as well as deepening our knowledge
of the way law is practised on an everyday basis.

Conclusion: From Motion Pictures
to Moving Images

I

n the preface to Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard describes the concept of simulacra by analogy to
a psychosomatic patient. For purely psychological reasons, psychosomatics develops real symptoms of illnesses.
Thus, when a given psychosomatic appears to fall ill,
there is no way for an external viewer to determine
whether the illness is a real one or a psychosomatic one.
Such a patient blurs the distinctions between true and
false, between the real and the imagined:
Is the simulator sick or not, given that he produces true
symptoms? Objectively one cannot treat him as being either
ill or not ill. Psychology and medicine stop at this point,
forestalled by the illness’s henceforth undiscoverable truth.
For if any symptom can be produced, and can no longer be
taken as a fact of nature, then every illness can be considered
as simulatable and simulated, and medicine loses its
meaning since it only knows how to treat illnesses
according to their objective causes. 90

Baudrillard’s observations about medicine are
equally applicable to law in today’s environment. Representations of justice have become so predominant in
popular culture, and the influence of those representations on societal constructions of justice runs so deep,
that it is longer possible to distinguish between ‘‘real’’
justice (symptoms of real, physical illnesses) and externally produced images of it (psychosomatic symptoms).
And just as the study of reality can no longer be separated from the study of images of reality, so the study of
adjudication — the doing of justice — can no longer be
separated from the representation of justice. But unlike
those post-modernists (and their traditionalist critics)
who insist that such premises inevitably lead to the
‘‘death of justice’’, we, instead, would like to propose that
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our current position gives us a uniquely interesting critical perspective.
In this article, we have argued that there is a symbiotic link between cinema and the law, and that this link
can be used to deepen our understanding of the ways in
which the legal system functions. Film theorists would
benefit from pursuing this resonance as well. For
example, the complex interconnections between the
poetics of legal proceedings and cinematographic poetics
may help to explain the abiding popularity of legal proceedings as a theme and plot device in films. If the law is
really, as Todorov claims, the natural arena for performative attempts at verisimilitude, then it is no wonder that
the medium whose main objective is the creation of
verisimilitude revisits the law again and again.
We have tried to map out some of the ways in
which the poetics of law replicate, or resonate with, the
poetics of film. We hope that the initial lines of delineation presented here will encourage others to continue
this process, thereby further shedding light on the legal
system’s attempts to render justice and adjudication visible. Such attempts will surely run parallel with continued efforts to trace the relationship between law and
other semantic fields, such as literature and theatre, not
to mention film’s potent, much unexamined offspring,
television and the Internet.
The technological capabilities available today for representing factual events in a virtual, apparently fail-safe

manner titillates the imagination of legislators and academics. Some zealously call for the mass adoption of
these technologies as evidentiary tools that can greatly
improve the quality of judges’ and juries’ decisionmaking. 91 Those who question the incursion of such
technologies into the courtroom are accused of being
reactionary, anachronistic, and technophobic. A higher
awareness of the epistemological processes involved
might shift the focus of the debate. In this connection, a
historical understanding of the semantic changes that
film has undergone over the past century could prove
vital.
The development of the basic theoretical tools we
have suggested will make it possible to reexamine
polemical debates, including those surrounding the evidentiary status of reenactments, the televised broadcast
of trials, and other areas in which the performative
aspects of the law are foregrounded, in a new light. 92
They will also help us weigh the desirability of any
restrictions the legal system might place upon the introduction of new technologies in order to limit the total
imposition of the simulacra effect in the courtroom.
Without such regulations, courtrooms may soon find
themselves flooded with an uncontrolled, and uncontrollable, stream of moving images that threaten to
undermine the epistemological and societal status of the
law as the entity that defines both how justice must be
seen, and how it must be done.
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